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 These are appeals filed under the formal procedure pursuant 
to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65 from the 
refusal of the appellee, the Board of Assessors of the Town of 
Barre (“appellee” or “assessors”), to abate taxes on certain 
personal property in the Town of Barre owned by and assessed to, 
respectively, Quabbin Solar, LLC, Quabbin Wind, LLC, and Barre 
Wool Solar, LLC (collectively, the “appellants”) under 
G.L. c.  59, §§ 11 and 38 for fiscal year 2016 (“fiscal year at 
issue”).   
 Commissioner Good heard these appeals. Chairman Hammond and 
Commissioners Scharaffa, Rose, and Chmielinski joined her in the 
decisions for the appellants. 
 These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a 
request by the appellee under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 
1.32. 
 
 Nicholas D. Bernier, Esq. for the appellants. 
 
Ellen M. Hutchinson, Esq. for the appellee. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
 
 These appeals, which were consolidated for hearing, involve 
three separate but commonly owned entities and present the same 
primary issue: whether personal property in the form of solar 
arrays owned by the appellants was exempt from taxation under 
G. L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 45 (“Clause Forty-Fifth”).  Clause Forty-
Fifth provides an exemption for any:  
solar or wind powered system or device which is being 
utilized as a primary or auxiliary power system for the 
purpose of heating or otherwise supplying the energy needs 
of property taxable under this chapter; provided, however, 
that the exemption under this clause shall be allowed only 
for a period of twenty years from the date of the 
installation of such system or device. 
 
Here the assessors conceded that the solar arrays
1
 at issue 
constituted “solar… powered system[s]” for purposes of Clause 
Forty-Fifth, and the parties did not dispute that the twenty-
year period had yet to expire.  The issues remaining in dispute 
focused on the other requirements set forth within Clause Forty-
Fifth, and the adequacy of the evidence offered by the 
appellants. Based on the testimony and documentary evidence 
entered into the record at the hearing of these appeals, the 
Appellate Tax Board (“Board”) made the following findings of 
fact.   
                                                          
1 The solar arrays at issue had a generating capacity of between one and two 
megawatts. 
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On January 1, 2015, each of the appellants was the assessed 
owner of personal property in the form of solar arrays located 
in Barre (collectively, the “subject property”).   The relevant 
valuation and tax information for each appellant is set forth in 
the following table.  
 
 
Appellant  Assessed 
Value 
Tax Rate 
Per $1,000 
Total Tax 
Assessed 
Quabbin 
Solar, LLC 
$1,013,860 $17.80 $18,046.71 
Quabbin Wind, 
LLC 
$1,013,860 $17.80 $18,046.71 
Barre Wool 
Solar, LLC 
$1,634,100 $17.80 $29,086.98 
 
Each of the appellants timely paid at least one-half of the 
total tax assessed in accordance with G.L. c. 59, § 64.  The 
appellants each timely filed Applications for Abatement with the 
assessors on February 1, 2016.  The abatement applications were 
deemed denied on May 1, 2016, and the assessors sent notice to 
the appellants of their deemed denial on May 3, 2016.  The 
appellants timely filed petitions with the Board on May 16, 
2016, and on the basis of the foregoing facts, the Board found 
and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide these 
appeals.   
 The appellants offered into the record documentary evidence 
as well as the testimony of the owner and manager of all three 
of the appellants, Michael Staiti.  Mr. Staiti testified about 
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the formation of the appellants as well as their day-to-day 
operations, and the Board found him to be credible.   
Mr. Staiti explained that he established the appellants in 
2010 but they did not become fully operational until 2012.  He 
testified that the appellants entered into an interconnectivity 
agreement, also referred to as a net-metering agreement, with 
National Grid that permitted the appellants to connect their 
solar arrays to the electrical grid and to receive credits for 
the value of electricity produced and made available to the 
electrical grid. Net-metering agreements allow parties to 
allocate the credits among various recipients, and those 
allocations are reported on Schedule Z of the net-metering 
agreement.   
Mr. Staiti testified that the appellants entered into a 
purchase agreement with Honey Farms, Inc. (“Honey Farms”), a 
for-profit, family-owned enterprise that operates a chain of 
convenience stores in Massachusetts. Under the purchase 
agreement, Honey Farms paid the appellants for the net-metering 
credits generated by the subject property to offset their own 
electricity expenses.  Mr. Staiti testified that Honey Farms is 
the sole customer of the appellants.   
Schedule Z of each of the appellants’ net-metering 
agreements with National Grid was entered into evidence as part 
of appellants’ Exhibit 1, and the schedules set forth the 
ATB 2017-484 
 
percentages of net-metering credits to be allocated to each 
Honey Farms location.  The Schedule Z for appellant Barre Wool 
Solar, LLC allocated the net-metering credits among eleven Honey 
Farms locations, while the Schedules Z for the other two 
appellants allocated the credits among a total of sixteen Honey 
Farms locations.   
Also contained within Exhibit 1 were property record cards 
that the appellants asserted, and the Board found, corresponded 
to each of the Honey Farms locations referenced on the Schedules 
Z.
2
 Honey Farms was the owner of certain of the properties, but 
it leased rather than owned the majority of the parcels.  In 
either case, the property records demonstrated that each of the 
Honey Farms locations at issue was situated on an improved 
parcel that was taxable under Chapter 59 for purposes of Clause 
Forty-Fifth.   
 Based on the foregoing, the Board found and ruled that the 
appellants established that the subject property constituted 
“solar … powered systems[s]… being utilized as a primary or 
auxiliary power system[s] for the purpose of heating or 
                                                          
2 The assessors challenged the sufficiency of the evidence proffered by the 
appellants on numerous fronts.  One of the assessors’ contentions was that 
the appellants failed to establish that the property record cards contained 
within Exhibit 1 corresponded to the Honey Farms locations listed on the 
Schedules Z. As will be discussed further below, the Board found that the 
evidence offered by the appellants, in its totality, was both credible and 
sufficient and it therefore rejected the assessors’ arguments.  
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otherwise supplying the energy needs of property taxable” under 
Chapter 59, and it therefore qualified for the exemption.  
The assessors advanced a number of arguments in support of 
their position that the subject property was not entitled to the 
exemption under Clause Forty-Fifth.  Among their arguments was 
the contention that in order to qualify for the exemption, the 
appellants were required to show that Honey Farms was 
responsible for the payment of electricity under the terms of 
the leases for those properties that it did not own, and that 
they failed to make such a showing.  The Board rejected this 
argument for a number of reasons. First, it disagreed with the 
assessors’ contention as a factual matter. The evidence in its 
totality in fact showed that Honey Farms was responsible for the 
payment of electricity in each of the relevant locations, and 
the Board so found.  Second, and as will be discussed further in 
the Opinion below, the Board found that there is no such 
requirement in the plain language of Clause Forty-Fifth.  
Therefore, this argument was without merit.  
The assessors additionally argued, for the first time in 
their post-hearing brief, that the appellants are “generation 
companies” under G.L. c. 164, which regulates net-metering 
arrangements, and are therefore not eligible to participate in 
the net-metering process. The Board rejected this eleventh-hour 
argument for several reasons. First, it was inappropriately 
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raised for the first time by the assessors in their post-hearing 
brief, rather than prior to or during the hearing, which would 
have afforded the appellants an opportunity to respond.  The 
Board specifically found and ruled that equity and good 
conscience did not require consideration of this argument. 
See G.L. c. 58A, § 7.  See Massachusetts Bay Lines, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 
2007-723, 743-47, aff’d, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 321 (2008) (finding 
and ruling that the Board was not bound by equity and good 
conscience to consider an argument that was raised late),.  
Moreover, the question of whether the appellants are eligible to 
participate in the net-metering process is misdirected to the 
Board.  The appellants did in fact receive net-metering credits 
at all times material to these appeals.  Whether they should 
have received or should continue to receive net-metering credits 
is an issue appropriately directed to another forum.  
Accordingly, the Board declined to consider this argument.   
The assessors’ remaining arguments were essentially a 
laundry list of alleged deficiencies in the evidence offered by 
the appellants. The Board was not persuaded by these arguments, 
which were primarily directed at the sufficiency of the 
documentary evidence.   
To begin with, the Board did not consider the record to be 
deficient in the manner alleged by the assessors.  Many of their 
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complaints were directed at the purported lack of clarity on the 
property record cards offered into evidence. These property 
record cards were drawn from on-line databases maintained by 
assessors in the ordinary course of business, and are of the 
type frequently offered into evidence before the Board.  While 
it is true that property record cards culled from on-line 
databases do not provide as much information as other versions, 
that does not render the information unreliable.
3
 The Board found 
the appellee’s complaints about these documents to be 
disingenuous.  
Moreover, many of the evidentiary deficiencies pointed to 
by the assessors related to the appellants’ supposed failure to 
establish that Honey Farms was the party responsible for the 
payment of electricity at each of the locations referenced in 
the Schedules Z. As stated above, the Board found that the 
appellants had no obligation to establish this fact in order to 
claim the exemption under Clause Forty-Fifth, and the Board 
therefore rejected this argument.   
Most troubling, however, was the repeated refrain in the 
assessors’ post-hearing brief that there was simply “no 
                                                          
3 The property record cards were offered solely for the purpose of 
demonstrating that the parcels to which they relate were subject to tax under 
Chapter 59. Assuming, arguendo, that these record cards were somehow 
deficient, as suggested by the assessors, there was no evidence in the record 
suggesting that any of the parcels was exempt from tax under chapter 59, nor 
was it logical to so infer, as the parcels were either owned or leased by 
Honey Farms, a for-profit business.   
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evidence” to support a number of claims made by the appellants.  
In each case, the assessors failed to acknowledge the extensive 
and detailed testimony of Michael Staiti, the founder and 
Manager of the appellants, whom the Board found to be credible.  
The Board found that Mr. Staiti had detailed knowledge of 
the day-to-day operations of the appellants as well as their 
sole customer, Honey Farms. He testified that he is in “almost 
daily, certainly weekly” contact with Honey Farms and visits the 
locations referenced within Exhibit 1. Mr. Staiti was able to 
confirm that Honey Farms is operating a business at each of the 
locations; that the electric meter at each location is in Honey 
Farms’ name; and that Honey Farms is still receiving the net-
metering credits in those locations.   
Mr. Staiti’s uncontroverted testimony, which was given 
under oath and reported by an official stenographer, is as much 
a part of the record in these appeals as any document. The 
assessors’ assertions that there was “no evidence” to support 
the appellants’ claims was therefore without merit, and the 
Board rejected these arguments.   
In conclusion, on the basis of the evidence in its 
totality, the Board found that the appellants met their burden 
of proving that the subject property was entitled to the 
exemption provided by Clause Forty-Fifth, and it therefore 
issued decisions for the appellants in these appeals.  The Board 
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granted abatements of tax in the following amounts: $18,046.71 
to Quabbin Solar, LLC; $18,046.71 to Quabbin Wind, LLC; and 
$29,086.98 to Barre Wool Solar, LLC, along with applicable 
interest.   
     
      OPINION  
All property, real and personal, situated within the 
Commonwealth is subject to local tax, unless expressly exempt. 
G.L. c. 59, § 2. As previously noted, such an exemption is 
provided in Clause Forty-Fifth for a: 
solar or wind powered system or device which is being 
utilized as a primary or auxiliary power system for the 
purpose of heating or otherwise supplying the energy needs 
of property taxable under this chapter; provided, however, 
that the exemption under this clause shall be allowed only 
for a period of twenty years from the date of the 
installation of such system or device. 
 
G. L. c. 59, § 5, cl. 45. A taxpayer seeking an exemption bears 
the burden of proving that the subject property qualifies 
“according to the express terms or the necessary implication of 
a statute providing the exemption.” New England Forestry 
Foundation, Inc. v. Assessors of Hawley, 468 Mass. 138, 148 
(2014). 
Courts interpret a statute in accordance with the plain 
meaning of its text. Reading Coop. Bank v. Suffolk Constr. Co., 
464 Mass. 543, 547-48 (2013)(citing Massachusetts Community 
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College Council MTA/NEA v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 402 Mass. 
352, 354 (1988)). As the primary source of insight into the 
intent of the Legislature is the language of the statute, if the 
language of the statute is unambiguous, a court’s function is to 
enforce the statute according to its terms. Id. at 548; 
International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 853 
(1983).   
There is nothing ambiguous in the language of Clause Forty-
Fifth, and the plain meaning of its words requires only that the 
subject property be: (1) a solar or wind powered system or 
device; (2) utilized as a primary or auxiliary power system for 
the purpose of heating or otherwise supplying energy; and (3) 
utilized to supply the energy needs of property that is subject 
to Massachusetts property tax. Based on the evidence presented, 
the Board found and ruled that the solar arrays at issue here 
were solar powered systems within the meaning of Clause Forty-
Fifth and used as a primary or auxiliary power system supplying 
the energy needs of taxable property in Massachusetts.  
Therefore, the Board found and ruled that the subject property 
fulfills all of the express requirements of Clause Forty-Fifth.  
The facts of the present appeals are similar to those in 
Forrestall Enterprises, Inc. v. Assessors of Westborough, 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2014-1025 (“Forrestall”) 
and KTT, LLC v. Assessors of Swansea, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact 
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and Reports 2016-426 (“KTT”), in which the Board also ruled in 
favor of the taxpayers.  In Forrestall, the solar array at issue 
was used to generate power for several residential and business 
properties located on taxable parcels that were different than 
the parcel on which the solar array was located.
4
  As here, the 
taxpayer in Forrestall had entered into a net-metering agreement 
under which the credits for the power generated by the solar 
array were allocated among the various properties.  Id. at 2014-
1028.     
The assessors in Forrestall urged the Board to construe 
Clause Forty-Fifth in a way that limited its application to 
solar arrays that supply power to property located on the same, 
or a contiguous, parcel as the solar array.  Id. at 2014-1030. 
The basis for the assessors’ argument in that case was that 
Clause Forty-Fifth should be construed as a personal exemption, 
like many of the other exemptions found within G.L. c. 59, § 5, 
such as clauses 37, 42, and 43, each of which are limited to a 
single residential property that is occupied as the domicile of 
the person eligible for the exemption.  G.L. c. 59, § 5, cls. 
37, 42, and 43.  However, each of those clauses contains express 
language limiting the scope of the exemption to specific 
property, while Clause Forty-Fifth does not.  The Board 
                                                          
4 The properties receiving the energy credits in Forrestall were all owned 
directly by or through entities controlled by the same person, Bruce 
Forrestall.  
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therefore rejected the assessors’ argument in that case as it 
was without support in the statute.  Forrestall at 2014-1030.   
The facts in KTT were similar to those in Forrestall, with 
the key distinction being that the energy generated by the solar 
arrays at issue was credited to an unrelated third party - a 
local bank - and allocated among the bank’s branch locations, in 
exchange for cash payments, as here.  The assessors in that case 
argued that this type of commercial use was not what the 
Legislature intended to favor with an exemption in enacting 
Clause Forty-Fifth.  The Board likewise rejected this argument 
as being without support in the language of Clause Forty-Fifth.  
KTT, LLC at 2016-433.      
In the present appeals, the assessors advanced a different 
twist on the arguments made by the assessors in Forrestall and 
KTT.  Most of the properties referenced in the net-metering 
agreements were leased rather than owned by Honey Farms.  The 
assessors argued that in order to qualify for the exemption, the 
appellant was required to show that Honey Farms was responsible 
for payment of the electricity under the terms of the lease at 
the properties being supplied with energy via the net-metering 
agreements.  Once again the Board rejected this argument as 
lacking support in the statutory language.     
As the Board observed in KTT and Forrestall, unlike other 
statutes granting exemption, there is no limiting language in 
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Clause Forty-Fifth relating to individuals.  See G.L. c. 64H, 
§ 6(dd) (sales tax exemption enacted in 1977 for “a primary or 
auxiliary power system for the purpose of heating or otherwise 
supplying the energy needs of an individual’s principal 
residence in the commonwealth”); see also G.L. c. 59, § 5, cls. 
37, 42, and 43. Rather, the limiting language in Clause Forty-
Fifth is directed toward property, specifically, “property that 
is taxable,” under chapter 59.  The statutory language requires 
no unity of ownership between the “property that is taxable” 
under chapter 59 and the personal property for which the 
exemption is being sought, nor does it address the identity of 
the individual responsible for payment of the “energy needs” 
being supplied by such property.  Where the Legislature has not 
included language in the statute expressing the limitation 
advocated by the assessors, the Board will not interpret the 
statute to impose such a limitation.  See Anderson Street 
Associates v. City of Boston & another, 442 Mass. 812, 817 
(2004) (“Had the Legislature intended G.L. c. 121A to guarantee 
tax concessions to be permanent, it could have included 
statutory language to that effect.  It has done so elsewhere.”); 
Commissioner of Revenue v. Cargill, Inc., 429 Mass. 79, 82 
(1999) (“Had the Legislature intended to limit the credit in the 
manner advocated by the commissioner, it easily could have done 
so.”).  
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 The assessors additionally challenged the sufficiency of 
the evidence offered by the appellants. The Board was not 
persuaded by their arguments.  The Board’s evidentiary standard, 
with few exceptions not applicable here, is proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  See Assessors of New Braintree 
v. Pioneer Valley Academy, 355 Mass. 610, 612 (1969); Space 
Building Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue, 413 Mass. 445, 
450 (1992).  As the Board has observed before, the preponderance 
standard does not require certitude, but instead means that the 
party with the burden of proof must show that the facts 
necessary to prevail in its claim were more likely true than 
not.  See Dental Service of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Commissioner 
of Revenue, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2017-45, 63; 
Gates v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 255 Mass. 297, 301 (1926); 
Black v. Boston Consol. Gas Co., 325 Mass. 505, 508 (1950); 
Sullivan v. Hammacher, 339 Mass. 190, 194 (1959).  In deciding 
whether a party has met this burden, the Board must be mindful 
that the "'[e]vidence of a party having the burden of proof may 
not be disbelieved without an explicit and objectively adequate 
reason.'" New Boston Garden Corp. v. Assessors of Boston, 
383 Mass. 456, 470-71 (1981) (quoting L.L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL CONTROL 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 607-608 (1965)).   
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 In the present appeals, the appellants offered extensive 
documentary and testimonial evidence to demonstrate that the 
subject property met the requirements for exemption under Clause 
Forty-Fifth.  The assessors for their part called no witnesses, 
and their documentary evidence consisted of only the requisite 
jurisdictional documents and copies of the appellants’ annual 
reports, which were filed with the Massachusetts Secretary of 
State.  The evidence offered by the assessors did nothing to 
undercut the evidence offered by the appellants.  Accordingly, 
the Board rejected the assessors’ arguments, and instead 
concluded that the appellants met their burden of proving that 
the subject property was exempt under Clause Forty-Fifth.  
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 In conclusion, on the basis of all of the evidence, the 
Board found and ruled that the subject property was exempt under 
Clause Forty-Fifth, and therefore issued decisions for the 
appellants in these appeals.  The Board granted abatements of 
tax in the following amounts: $18,046.71 to Quabbin Solar, LLC; 
$18,046.71 to Quabbin Wind, LLC; and $29,086.98 to Barre Wool 
Solar, LLC, along with applicable interest.   
                             THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD 
 
 
By: _________________________________ 
         Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman 
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